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Abstract
Many distributed protocols in the partial synchrony setting with Byzantine nodes divide the local state of the
nodes into views, and the transition from one view to the next dictates a leader change. In order to provide
liveness, all honest nodes need to stay in the same view for a sufficiently long time. This requires intricate
mechanisms that are typically intertwined with the rest of the protocol, making it hard to understand and to
reason about. Furthermore, state-machine replication, which is consisted of multiple instances of single-shot
consensus can use the same view synchronization protocol.
We define the Byzantine View Synchronization problem, which is responsible for eventually bringing all
nodes to the same view for a sufficiently long time.
Two approaches for implementing a protocol that achieves view synchronization exhibit the following
tradeoffs: a view doubling solution has zero communication costs but unbounded latency, while a broadcast-
based solution has quadratic communication costs but constant latency. We describe both protocols, prove their
correctness, and also introduce a third protocol, named Lumière1, that has optimistically linear communica-
tion complexity and constant latency, and faced with benign failures, has expected linear communication and
constant latency. Lumière is particularly useful for a family of consensus protocols that exhibit linear commu-
nication under various circumstances.
2012 ACM Subject Classification Theory of computation→ Distributed algorithms
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1 Introduction
1.1 Background and Motivation
Many practical reliable distributed systems do not rely on network synchrony because networks go
through outages and periods of DDoS attacks; and because synchronous protocols have hard coded
steps that delay system under all conditions the worst-case communication latency bound. Instead,
asynchronous replication solutions via State Machine Replication (SMR) [35] usually optimize for
stability periods. This approach is modeled as partial synchrony [21]. It allows for periods of
asynchrony in which progress might be compromised, but consistency never does. This paradigm
underlies most successful industrial solutions, for example, the Google Chubbie lock service [9],
Yahoo’s ZooKeeper [26], etcd [22], Google’s Spanner [16], Apache Cassandra [12] and others.
In the partial synchrony settings, SMR solutions typically divide the execution into logical
rounds (e.g., [31, 5, 13]). In each round, progress depends on synchronizing all non-faulty nodes to
overlap in the round for a sufficiently long period. For example, rounds can be used to designate a
leader whose job is to drive progress in the protocol. Progress depends on a non-faulty leader emerg-
ing and all non-faulty nodes communicating with the leader in a timely manner. A round might not
1 Lumière is the enchanted candelabra from Disney’s classic “Beauty and the Beast”.
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succeed in making progress due to a faulty leader or because nodes enter the round at different times.
Nodes may give up on a bad round by timer expiration and advance to the next round.
If we only care about eventuality, the seminal work of Chandra and Toueg [14, 15] captures the
abstract conditions under which progress is guaranteed. Specifically, they define a leader election
abstraction, denoted Ω, where eventually all non-faulty nodes trust the same non-faulty node as the
leader. Indeed,Ω was shown to be the weakest “failure detector” needed in order to solve consensus.
Whereas failure detector analysis focuses on possibility/impossibility, here we care about how
quickly it takes for a good leader to emerge and at what communication cost.
We introduce the problem of view synchronization which is how to repeatedly bring all honest
nodes to execute the same view for sufficiently long time, in the face of asynchrony and in the pres-
ence of faulty nodes. We define two performance measures, latency and communication complexity,
both occurring in between two abstract view change events.
More concretely, a view change occurs as an interplay between the view synchronization protocol
and the outer consensus solutions. The consensus solution must signal that it wishes to end the
current view via a wish_to_advance() notification. The synchronizer eventually invokes a consensus
propose_view() signal to indicate when a new view starts. Latency and communication complexities
are measured in between these two events.
In this paper, we tackle the view synchronization problem against asynchrony and the most
severe type of faults, Byzantine [33, 30]. This makes the synchronizers we develop particularly
suited for Byzantine Fault Tolerance (BFT) consensus systems relevant in today’s crypto-economics
systems.
More specifically, we assume a system of n nodes that need to form a sequence of consensus
decisions that implement SMR. We assume up to f < n/3 nodes are Byzantine, the upper bound
on the number of Byzantine nodes in which Byzantine agreement is solvable [24]. The challenge is
that during “happy” periods, progress might be made among a group of Byzantine nodes cooperating
with a “fast” sub-group of the honest nodes. Indeed, many solutions advance when a leader succeeds
in proposing a value to a quorum of 2f + 1 nodes, but it is possible that only the f + 1 “fast”
honest nodes learn it and progress to the next round. The remaining f “slow” honest nodes might
stay behind, and may not even advance rounds (not only views) at all. Then at some point, the f
Byzantine nodes may stop cooperating. A mechanism is needed to bring the “slow” nodes to the
same round as the f + 1 “fast” ones.
Usually, the steps for synchronizing rounds are intertwined with the consensus protocol itself,
leaving each distributed protocol to rethink of a solution and integrate it as part of the protocol
itself. This often complicates protocol design and make it hard to evaluate and reason about. Often,
liveness is only dealt with once and in eventuality. Indeed, in classic works such as [31] which
solve consensus,Ω was part of the protocol, without discussing it as a separate problem or analyzing
possible implementation in terms of latency and communication costs of such an implementation.
In addition, Ω was designed for a one-time consensus instance, and not SMR, which requires a
recurring leader election. The result is that many protocols just provide eventual liveness, without
taking into account constraints such as latency bounds and communication complexity. To the best
of our knowledge, this paper is the first to formally define the problem of view synchronization and
explore its characteristics as a separate problem.
We present three different algorithms to reach view synchronization and compare them in terms
of latency (how long it takes to reach round synchronization), and communication complexity (how
many messages need to be sent in the network overall). We name the module which reaches round
synchronization a synchronizer, and look at higher-level protocols, such as consensus, which can
utilize the synchronizer. Each protocol we present has tradeoffs compared with others, and we
discuss these in the paper.
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Some of the improvements embodied in these protocols may be valuable for a family of Byzan-
tine SMR protocols, which include Zyzzyva [28], Casper [10], Tendermint [7, 8], HotStuff [38], and
LibraBFT [3]. All these protocols state that in certain cases, e.g., as long as there is an honest leader,
the protocol makes progress with linear communication and constant latency. Synchronizers such
as the ones described in this paper may help find optimizations for these consensus protocols and
broaden the cases in which they possess linear communication complexity and latency.
1.2 View synchronization algorithms
Our model assumes the eventual synchrony model, first introduced by DLS in [21], it divides the
execution to time of asynchrony, where messages between honest nodes are eventually delivered,
but without a bound on arrival, and a global time named GST (Global Stabilization Time), after
which the execution is synchronous, and messages arrive within a bounded time between honest
nodes. More detail on the model is given in §2.
We introduce three synchronization protocols, which are described intuitively next.
View doubling synchronizer
The first protocol doubles the duration of each view, e.g., the second view will be twice as long as
the first view. Eventually, there is guaranteed to be a sufficiently long time in which all the nodes are
in the same view. This protocol does not require any message transmission between the nodes in the
system, however, the time in which it takes to reach view synchronization is unbounded.
The idea of doubling the view duration is inspired from the PBFT consensus algorithm [13],
were each view has a timer for T time, and if no progress is made an honest node tries to move to
the next view and sets its timer to 2T . Note that in PBFT though, messages do pass between nodes
as part of the consensus protocol itself, and if the progress is reached, the timer of the view is reset
to T again.
Broadcast-based synchronizer
The second algorithm we present is based on the Bracha reliable broadcast algorithm [6]. This is a
leaderless algorithm that after GST ensures that once f + 1 nodes wish to enter the same view, all
the honest nodes will enter the same view within a bounded time.
This protocol is based on reliable broadcast, which requires a quadratic number of messages to
succeed, and has a constant latency.
Lumière: Leader-based synchronizer
The third protocol we describe is Lumière, which is leader-based. This protocol utilizes views that
have an honest leader as a relay point for messages, instead of broadcasting them. Thus, when a
node wishes to send a message across the network, it will only send it to the leader of the view. If
the leader is honest, it will gather the messages from the nodes and multicast them using a threshold
signature [4, 11, 36] to the rest of the nodes, with only linear communication costs, instead of the
usual reliable broadcast, which requires a quadratic number of messages [6]. The protocol itself,
since it cannot rely on broadcast, has to deploy other measures to ensure that view synchronization
is still achieved.
The latency and communication complexity of this algorithm depend on the number of con-
secutive Byzantine leaders after GST, and in the average case, the communication complexity is
optimal linear and the latency is expected constant. The downside of this approach though is that
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View doubling Broadcast-based
Lumière:
leader-based
Fault type
Communication
complexity 0 O(n
2)
Byzantine
optimal O(n)
expected O(n2)
Benign
expected O(n)
worst-case O(t · n)
Latency unbounded O(δ)
Byzantine
+ Benign
expected O(δ)
worst-case O(t · δ)
Table 1 Comparison of the different protocols for view synchronization. t is the number of actual failures,
and δ is the bound on message delivery after GST.
in the worst-case of f consecutive Byzantine leaders after GST, the latency is linear with expected
quadratic communication costs.
In addition, if considering only benign failures, then the overall communication complexity is
expected linear instead of optimal linear, while the latency is still expected constant.
Comparison A comparison of the three approaches in terms of latency and communication com-
plexity is summarized in Tab. 1. See §3 for a formal description of how the two are computed. Note
that all messages sent in all the protocols are constant size. In the table, t ≤ f is the number of
actual Byzantine failures, and δ is the bound on message delivery after GST.
From the table, one can deduce that each protocol has its pros and cons. While a view doubling
synchronizer sends 0 messages its latency until view synchronization is unbounded, and in contrast
a broadcast-based synchronizer sends a quadratic number of messages but ensures constant latency.
Meanwhile, Lumière results depend on the ordering of the leaders, yielding expected constant
latency, but worst-case linear, and linear optimal communication complexity with expected quadratic
if facing Byzantine nodes. When facing benign failures, Lumière has expected linear communication
costs with worst-case quadratic, and still expected constant latency.
The choice between the three protocols for an upper-layer protocol to use depends on the needs.
E.g., if the upper-layer protocol is leader-based and progress is not guaranteed with a Byzantine
leader, then the use of the reliable broadcast-based synchronizer might not be the right choice, since
even though it will get view synchronization within constant time, the leader of the upper-layer pro-
tocol will not drive progress if it is Byzantine. Thus, a more natural choice will be Lumière. If there
is a need to lower communication complexity, one might choose the view doubling synchronizer at
a cost of potential high latency and so on.
1.3 Contributions
The contributions of this paper as follows:
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to formally define the problem of view
synchronization as a separate problem in the distributed setting. This definition helps to bridge
the gap between classic works on failure detectors for one-time consensus and an infinite run of
an SMR consisted of multiple instances of single-shot consensus.
We describe two natural algorithms for view synchronization. The first is based on view dura-
tion doubling, and the second on all-to-all communication, i.e. reliable broadcast. This is the
first time that these algorithms are described as a separate component to reach view synchroniza-
tion, we prove their correctness and analyze the two in terms of communication complexity and
latency until view synchronization is reached.
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We introduce a third view synchronization protocol, Lumière, which is leader-based. Lumière
exhibits optimal linear communication when facing Byzantine leaders and expected linear com-
munication with benign failures. In both settings the expected latency of Lumière is constant.
Like the previous two protocols, we do a full analysis of its correctness.
We compare the three view synchronization protocols and their tradeoffs from one another. This
gives an upper-layer protocol a more informed choice to make when choosing what synchronizer
to use.
Structure The rest of this paper is structured as follows: §2 discusses the model; §3 formally
defines the view synchronization problem; §4 defines the three view synchronization protocols with
formal correctness proofs and comparison of their latency and communication cost; §5 describes
related work; and §6 concludes the paper.
2 Model
We follow the eventual synchronous model [21] in which the execution is divided into two dura-
tions; first, an unbounded period of asynchrony, where messages do not have a bounded time until
delivered; and then, a period of synchrony, where messages are delivered within a bounded time,
denoted as δ. The switch between the first and second periods occurs at a moment named Global
Stabilization Time (GST). We assume all messages sent before GST arrive at or before GST+ δ .
Our model consists of a set Π = {Pi}
n
i=1 of n nodes, and a known mapping, denoted by
Leader(·): N 7→ Π. We use a cryptographic signing scheme, a public key infrastructure (PKI) to
validate signatures, as well as a threshold signing scheme [4, 11, 36]. The threshold signing scheme
is used in order to create a compact signature of k-of-n nodes and is used in other consensus proto-
cols such as [11]. Usually k = f + 1 or k = 2f + 1.
We assume a non-adaptive adversary who can corrupt up to f < n/3 nodes at the beginning
of the execution. This corruption is done without knowledge of the mapping Leader(·). The set
of remaining n − f honest nodes is denoted H . We assume the honest nodes may start their local
execution at different times.
In addition, as in [1, 11], we assume the adversary is polynomial-time bounded, i.e., the prob-
ability it will break the cryptographic assumptions in this paper (e.g., the cryptographic signatures,
threshold signatures, etc.) is negligible.
3 Problem definition
We define a synchronizer, which solves the view synchronization problem, to be a long-lived task
with an API that includes a wish_to_advance() operation and a propose_view(v) signal, where v ∈ N.
Nodes may repeatedly invoke wish_to_advance(), and in return get a possibly infinite sequence
of propose_view(·) signals. Informally, the synchronizer should be used by a high-level abstrac-
tion (e.g., BFT state-machine replication protocol) to synchronize view numbers in the following
way: All nodes start in view 0, and whenever they wish to move to the next view they invoke
wish_to_advance(). However, they move to view v only when they get a propose_view(v) signal.
Formally, a time interval I consists of a starting time t1 and an ending time t2 ≥ t1 and all
the time points between them. I’s length is |I| = t2 − t1. We say I
′ ⊆ I ′′ if I ′ begins after or
when I ′′ begins, and ends before or when I ′′ ends. We denote by tprop
P,v the time when node P gets
the signal propose_view(v), and assume that all nodes get propose_view(0) at the beginning of their
execution. We denote time t = 0 as the time when the last honest node began its execution, formally
maxP∈H t
prop
P,0 = 0. We further denote ∆
exec
P,v as the time interval in which node P is in view v, i.e.,
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∆exec
P,v begins at t
prop
P,v and ends at t
end
P,v , minv′>v
{
tprop
P,v′
}
. We say node P is at view v at time t, or
executes view v at time t, if t ∈ ∆exec
P,v .
We are now ready to define the two properties that any synchronizer must achieve:
◮ Property 1 (View synchronization). For every c ≥ 0 there exists α ≥ 0 and an infinite number
of time intervals and views {Ik, vk}
∞
k=1, such that if every interval between two wish_to_advance()
invocations by an honest node is α, then ∀k ≥ 1 : |Ik| ≥ c and ∀P ∈ H, k ≥ 1 : Ik ⊆ ∆
exec
P,vk
.
◮ Property 2 (Synchronization validity). A new view is proposed by the synchronizer only if
some honest node wished to advance to it. Formally, the synchronizer signals propose_view(v′) only
if there exists an honest node P ∈ H and some view v s.t. P calls wish_to_advance() at least v′ − v
times while executing view v.
Latency and communication complexity In order to define how the latency and message
communication complexity are calculated, we first define Istartk to be the time at which the k-th view
synchronization is reached. Formally, Istartk , maxP∈H
{
tprop
P,vk
}
, where vk is defined according to
Property 1.
With this we can define the latency of a synchronizer implementation:
◮ Definition 1 (Synchronizer latency). The latency of a synchronizer is defined as
maxk≥2
{
Istart1 − GST, I
start
k − I
start
k−1
}
.
Next, in order to define communication complexity, we first need to introduce a few more no-
tations. Let MP,v1✮v2 be the total number of messages P sent between t
prop
P,v1
and tprop
P,v2
. In addi-
tion, denoteMP,✮v as the total number of messages sent by P from the beginning of P’s execution
and tprop
P,v .
With this we define the communication complexity of a synchronizer implementation:
◮ Definition 2 (Synchronizer communication complexity). Denote vk the k-th view in which
view synchronization occurs (Property 1). The message communication cost of a synchronizer is
defined asmaxk≥2
{∑
P∈H MP,✮v1 ,
∑
P∈H MP,vk−1✮vk
}
.
We now proceed to discuss three protocols for synchronizers.
4 Protocols for view synchronization
Next, we present the three view synchronization protocols discussed informally in §1.2. All protocol
messages between nodes are signed and verified; for brevity, we omit the details about the crypto-
graphic signatures. In the protocol, when a node collects messages from x senders, it is implied that
these messages carry x distinct signatures.
4.1 View doubling synchronizer
Overview A solution approach inspired by PBFT [13] is to use view doubling as the view syn-
chronization technique. In this approach, each view has a timer, and if no progress is made the node
tries to move to the next view and doubles the timer time for the next view. Whenever progress
is made, the node resets its timer. This approach is intertwined with the consensus protocol itself,
making it hard to separate, as the messages of the consensus protocol are part of the mechanism used
to reset the timer.
We adopt this approach and turn it into an independent synchronizer that requires no messages.
Fist, the nodes need to agree on some predefined constant β > 0 which is the duration of the first
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Algorithm 1: View doubling synchronizer for node P
1 initialize :
2 wish← 0
3 curr← 0
4 view_duration← β /* β is a predefined value for the duration of the first view */
5 on wish_to_advance():
6 wish← wish + 1
7 after view_duration has passed since last changing its value:
8 curr← curr + 1
9 view_duration← 2× view_duration
10 if wish ≥ curr then
11 propose_view(curr)
view. Next, there exists some global view duration mapping VD(·) : N 7→ R+, which maps a view v
to its duration: VD(v) = 2vβ. A node in a certain view must move to the next view once this
duration passes, regardless of the outer protocol actions.
The view doubling protocol is described in Alg. 1. A node starts at view 0 (Line 3) and a view
duration of β > 0 (Line 4). Next, when wish_to_advance() is called, a counter named wish is
incremented (Line 5). This counter guarantees validity by moving to a view v only when the wish
counter reaches v. Every time a view ends (Line 7), an internal counter curr is incremented, and if
the wish allows it, the synchronizer outputs propose_view(v) with a new view v.
Correctness We show that the view doubling protocol achieves the properties required by a
synchronizer.
◮ Lemma 3. The view doubling protocol achieves view synchronization (Property 1).
Proof. Since this protocol does not require sending messages between nodes, the Byzantine nodes
cannot affect the behavior of the honest nodes, and we can treat all nodes as honest.
Recall that t = 0 denotes the time by which all the honest nodes started their local execu-
tion of Alg. 1. Let initi be the view at which node Pi is at during t = 0. W.l.o.g assume
init1 ≤ init2 ≤ · · · ≤ initn at time t = 0. It follows from the definition of initi and the sum of a
geometric series that
tprop
Pi,v
= β
(
2v − 2initi
)
. (1)
We begin by showing that for every i ≤ j the following condition holds: tprop
Pi,v
≥ tprop
Pj ,v
for any
view v. Let k = initi and l = initj . From the ordering of the node starting times, for all k ≤ l. We
get:
tprop
Pi,v
≥ tprop
Pj ,v
⇔ β
(
2v − 2k
)
≥ β
(
2v − 2l
)
⇔ l ≥ k.
Hence, for i ≤ j, since at t = 0 node Pj had a view number larger than Pi, then Pj will start all
future views before Pi.
Next, let k = init1 and l = initn, i.e., the minimal view and the maximal view at t = 0
respectively. To prove that the first interval of view synchronization is achieved, it suffices to show
that for any constant c ≥ 0 there exists a time interval I and a view v such that |I| ≥ c and
tpropn,v+1 − t
prop
1,v ≥ |I|. Using this, we will show that there exists an infinite number of such intervals
and views which will conclude the proof.
Indeed, first note that as shown above, node Pn will start view v before any other node in the
system. The left-hand side of the equation is the time length in which both node Pn and node P1
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execute together view v. If the left-hand side is negative, then there does not exist an overlap, and if
it is positive then an overlap exists.
We get
tpropn,v+1 − t
prop
1,v ≥ |I| ⇔ β
(
2v+1 − 2l
)
− β
(
2v − 2k
)
≥ |I| ⇔ β
[
2v +
(
2k − 2l
)]
≥ |I|. (2)
For any c ≥ 0 there exists a minimum view number v′ such that the inequality holds, and since k
is the minimum view number at t = 0 this solution holds for any other node Pi as well. In addition,
for any v ≥ v′ the inequality also holds, meaning there are infinite number of solutions for it.
If wish_to_advance() is called in intervals with 0 < α ≤ β then by the time the value of curr
reaches some view value v, wish will always be bigger than curr, meaning the condition in Line 10
will always be true, and the synchronizer will always propose view v by the time stated in Eq. (1).
◭
◮ Lemma 4. The view doubling protocol achieves synchronization validity (Property 2).
Proof. The if condition in Line 10 ensures that the output of the synchronizer will always be a view
that a node wished to advance to. ◭
This concludes the proof that view doubling is a synchronizer for any 0 < α ≤ β.
Latency and communication Since the protocol sends no messages between the nodes, it is
immediate that the communication complexity is 0.
As for latency, the minimal v∗ satisfying Eq. (2) grows with c
(
2initn − 2init1
)
. Since the initial
view-gap initn − init1 is unbounded, so is the view v
∗ in which synchronization is reached. The
latency to synchronization is tprop
P1,v∗
= 2v
∗
− 2init1 , also unbounded.
4.2 Broadcast-based synchronizer
Algorithm 2: Broadcast-based synchronizer for node P
1 initialize :
2 curr← 0
3 on wish_to_advance():
4 multicast “WISH, curr + 1” to all nodes (including self)
5 upon receiving f + 1 “WISH, v” messages and not sending “WISH, v” before:
6 multicast “WISH, v” to all nodes (including self)
7 upon receiving 2f+1 “WISH, v” messages and v > curr
8 curr← v
9 propose_view(v)
Overview Another leaderless approach is based on the Bracha reliable broadcast protocol [6]
and is presented in Alg. 2. In this protocol, when a node wants to advance to the next view v it
multicasts a “WISH, v” message (multicast means to send the message to all the nodes including
the sender) (Line 3). When at least f + 1 “WISH, v” messages are received by an honest node, it
multicasts “WISH, v” as well (Line 5). A node advances to view v upon receiving 2f + 1 “WISH, v”
messages (Line 7).
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Correctness We prove that the broadcast-based protocol is a synchronizer.
⊲ Claim 5. After GST, whenever an honest node enters view v at time t, all other honest nodes
enter view v by t+ 2δ, i.e.,maxPi∈H
{
tprop
Pi,v
}
−minPj∈H
{
tprop
Pj ,v
}
≤ 2δ.
Proof. Suppose an honest node Pi ∈ H enters view v at time t
prop
Pi,v
= t, then it received 2f + 1
“WISH, v” messages, from at least f + 1 honest nodes (Line 7).
Since the only option for an honest node to disseminate “WISH, v” message is by multicasting it,
then by t + δ all nodes will receive at least f + 1 “WISH, v” messages. Then, any left honest nodes
(at most f nodes) will thus receive enough “WISH, v” to multicast the message on their own (Line 5)
which will be received by t + 2δ by all the nodes. This ensures that all the honest nodes receive
2f + 1 “WISH, v” messages and enter view v by t+ 2δ. ⊳
⊲ Claim 6. After GST, eventually an honest node Pi enters some new view.
Proof. All honest nodes begin their local execution at view 0, potentially at different times. Based
on the protocol eventually at least f + 1 nodes (some of them might be Byzantine) send “WISH, 1”.
This is because wish_to_advance() is called every α. Thus, eventually all honest nodes will reach
view 1, and from Claim 5 the difference between their entry is at most 2δ after GST.
The above argument can be applied inductively. Suppose at time t node Pi is at view v. We
again know that by t + 2δ all other honest nodes are also at view v, and once f + 1 “WISH, v + 1”
are sent all honest nodes will eventually enter view v + 1, and we are done. ⊳
◮ Lemma 7. The broadcast-based protocol achieves view synchronization (Property 1).
Proof. From Claim 6 an honest node will eventually advance to some new view v and from Claim 5
after 2δ all other honest nodes will join it. For any c ≥ 0, if the honest nodes call wish_to_advance()
every α = 2δ + c then it is guaranteed that all the honest nodes will execute view v together for at
least |I| = c time, since it requires f + 1 messages to move to view v + 1, i.e., at least one message
is sent from an honest node.
This argument can be applied inductively, thus making an infinite number of time intervals and
views which all honest nodes execute at the same time. ◭
◮ Lemma 8. The broadcast-based synchronizer achieves synchronization validity (Property 2).
Proof. In order for an honest node to advance to view v it has to receive 2f + 1 “WISH, v” mes-
sages (Line 7). From those, at least f + 1 originated from honest nodes. An honest node can send
“WISH, v” on two scenarios:
(i) wish_to_advance() was called when the node was at view v − 1 (Line 3) and we are done.
(ii) It received f + 1 “WISH, v” messages (Line 5), meaning at least one honest node which
already sent the message was at view v−1 and called wish_to_advance() and again we are done. ◭
This concludes the proof that the broadcast-based synchronizer is a view synchronizer for
any α ≥ 2δ.
Latency and communication For latency, the broadcast-based synchronizer will take a con-
stant time to reach view synchronization after GST, as we have proved, and also the same between ev-
ery two consecutive occurrences of view synchronization. Thus, the latency of this protocol is O(δ).
For communication costs, the protocol requires that every node sends one “WISH, v” message to
all the other nodes, and since the latency is constant, the overall communication costs are quadratic,
i.e., O(n2).
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Algorithm 3: Lumière: Leader-based synchronizer for node P
1 initialize :
2 curr← 0
3 attemptedTC← 0
4 attemptedQC← 0
Every node:
5 on wish_to_advance():
6 send “WISH, curr + 1” to Leader(curr + 1)
7 upon receiving a valid “TC, v” from Leader(r) s.t. v ≤ r ≤ v + f + 1:
8 send “TC, v” to Leader(v) /* Ensures that if Leader(v) is honest then latency is linear */
9 send “VOTE, v” to Leader(r)
10 after 2δ from last sending “WISH, v” and not receiving “TC, v” and attemptedTC ≤ curr + f + 1:
11 send “WISH, v” to Leader(attemptedTC)
12 attemptedTC← attemptedTC + 1
13 upon receiving a valid “QC, v” from Leader(r) s.t. v ≤ r ≤ v + f + 1:
14 attemptedTC← v
15 attemptedQC← v
16 curr← v
17 propose_view(v)
18 after 2δ from last sending “VOTE, v” and not receiving “QC, v” and attemptedQC ≤ curr + f + 1:
/* Also need to send “TC, v” so that the next leader can multicast to the rest */
19 send “VOTE, v” and “TC, v” to Leader(attemptedQC)
20 attemptedQC← attemptedQC + 1
Leader (Leader(r) = P):
21 upon receiving f + 1 “WISH, v” or “TC, v” s.t. r − (f + 1) ≤ v ≤ r and not sending “TC, v” before:
22 multicast “TC, v” with a threshold signature to all nodes (including self)
23 upon receiving 2f + 1 “VOTE, v” messages s.t. r − (f + 1) ≤ v ≤ r and not sending “QC, v” before:
24 multicast “QC, v” with a threshold signature to all nodes (including self)
4.3 Lumière: Leader-based synchronizer
Overview In this section we present Lumière, a new approach for view synchronization that lever-
ages leaders to optimistically achieve linear communication. The key idea is that instead of nodes
broadcasting synchronization messages all-all and incurring quadratic communication, nodes send
messages to the leader of the view they wish to enter. If the leader is honest, it will relay a single
broadcast containing an aggregate of all the messages it received, thus incurring only linear commu-
nication.
If a leader of a view v is Byzantine, it might not help as a relay. In this case, the nodes time out
and then try to enlist the leaders of subsequent views, one by by one, up to view v + f + 1, to help
with relaying. Since at least one of those leaders is honest, one of these leaders will successfully
relay the aggergate.
The full protocol is presented in Alg. 3, and is consisted of several message types. The first
two are sent from a node to a leader. They are used to signal to the leader that the node is ready
to advance to the next stage in the protocol. Those messages are named “WISH, v” and “VOTE, v”
where v is the view the message refers to.
The other two message types are ones that are sent from leaders to nodes. The first is
called “TC, v” (short for “Time Certificate”) and is sent when the leader receives f + 1 “WISH, v”
messages; and the second is called “QC, v” (short for “Quarum Certificate”) and is sent when the
leader receives 2f + 1 “VOTE, v” messages. In both cases, a leader aggregates the messages it re-
ceives using threshold signatures such that each broadcast message from the leader contains only
one signature.
The general flow of the protocol is as follows: When wish_to_advance() is invoked, the node
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sends “WISH, v” to Leader(v), where v is the view succeeding curr (Line 5). Next, there are two
options: (i) If Leader(v) forms a “TC, v” , it broadcast it to all nodes (Line 21). The nodes then
respond with “VOTE, v” message to the leader (Line 7) (ii) Otherwise, if 2δ time elapses after send-
ing “WISH, v” to Leader(v) without receiving “TC, v” , a node gives up and sends “WISH, v” to
the next leader, i.e., Leader(v + 1) (Line 10). It then waits again 2δ before forwarding “WISH, v”
to Leader(v + 2). And so on, until “TC, v” is received.
Whenever “TC, v” has been received, a node sends “VOTE, v” (even if it did not send “WISH, v”)
to Leader(v). Additionally, as above, it enlists leaders one by one until “QC, v” is obtained. Here,
the node sends leaders “TC, v” as well as “VOTE, v”. When a node finally receives “QC, v” from a
leader, it enters view v immediately (Line 13).
Correctness We start by proving that if an honest node entered a new view, and the leader of
that view is honest, then all the other honest nodes will also enter that view within a bounded time.
⊲ Claim 9. After GST, if an honest node enters view v at time t, and the leader of view v
is honest then all the honest nodes enter view v by t + 4δ, i.e., if Leader(v) ∈ H then
maxPi∈H
{
tprop
Pi,v
}
−minPj∈H
{
tprop
Pj ,v
}
≤ 4δ.
Proof. Let Pi be the first honest node that entered view v at time t. Pi entered view v since it
received “QC, v” from Leader(r) such that v ≤ r ≤ v + f + 1 (Line 13).
If r = v then we are done, since when Leader(v) sent “QC, v” it also sent it to all the other
honest nodes (Line 24), which will be received by t+ δ, and all the honest nodes will enter view v.
Next, if r > k then the only way for Leader(v) to send “QC, v” is if it gathered 2f+1 “VOTE, v”
messages (Line 23), meaning at least f + 1 of the “VOTE, v” messages were sent by honest nodes.
An honest node will send a “VOTE, v” message only after first receiving “TC, v” from Leader(r′)
s.t. v ≤ r′ ≤ v + f + 1 (Line 7).
Since when receiving a “TC, v” an honest node sends the “TC, v” to Leader(v) (Line 8),
then Leader(v) will receive “TC, v” by t + δ, will forward it to all other nodes by t + 2δ, who
will send “VOTE, v” to Leader(v) by t + 3δ and by t + 4δ all honest nodes will receive “QC, v”
from Leader(v) and enter view v. ⊳
Next, assuming an honest node entered a new view, we bound the time it takes to at least f + 1
honest nodes to enter the same view. Note that this time we do not assume anything on the leader of
the new view, and it might be Byzantine.
⊲ Claim 10. After GST, when an honest node enters view v at time t, at least f + 1 honest nodes
enter view v by t+ 2δ(f + 2), i.e., after GST for every v there exists a group S of honest nodes s.t.
|S| ≥ f + 1 andmaxPi∈S
{
tprop
Pi,v
}
−minPj∈S
{
tprop
Pj ,v
}
≤ 2δ(f + 2).
Proof. Let Pi be the first node that entered view v at time t. Pi entered v since it received “QC, v”
from Leader(r) and v ≤ r ≤ v + f + 1 (Line 13). If Leader(r) is honest then we are done, since
Leader(r) multicasted “QC, v” to all honest nodes (Line 24), and within δ all honest nodes will also
enter view v by t+ δ.
Next, if Leader(r) is Byzantine, then it might have sent “QC, v” to a subset of the honest nodes,
potentially only to Pi. In order to form a “QC, v” , Leader(r) had to receive 2f + 1 “VOTE, v”
messages (Line 23), meaning that at least f+1 honest nodes sent “VOTE, v” to Leader(r). Denote S
as the group of those f + 1 honest nodes.
Each node in S sent “VOTE, v” message since it received “TC, v” from Leader(r′) for
v ≤ r′ ≤ v + f + 1 (Line 7). Note that different nodes in S might have received “TC, v” from
a different leader, i.e., Leader(r′) might not be the same leader for each node in S.
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After a node in S sent “VOTE, v” it will either receive a “QC, v” within 2δ and enter view v, or
timeout after 2δ and send “VOTE, v” with “TC, v” to Leader(v + 1) (Line 19). They will continue
to do so when not receiving “QC, v” for the next f + 1 views after v. This ensures that at least
one honest leader will receive “TC, v” after at most t + 2δf + δ. Then, this honest leader will
multicast the “TC, v” it received (Line 21) and at most by t + 2δ(f + 1), all the honest nodes will
receive “TC, v” . The honest nodes will then send “VOTE, v” to the honest leader, which will be
able to create “QC, v” and multicast it. The “QC, v” will thus be received by all the honest nodes
by t+ 2δ(f + 2) and we are done. ⊳
Next, we show that during the execution, an honest node will enter some new view.
⊲ Claim 11. After GST, some honest node Pi enters a new view.
Proof. From Claim 10, if an honest enters some view v, the time by which at least another f
other honest nodes also enter v is bounded. Eventually, those honest nodes will timeout and
wish_to_advance() will be invoked (Line 5), which will cause them to send “WISH, v + 1” to
Leader(v + 1).
If Leader(v+1) is honest, then it will send a “TC, v+1” to all the nodes (Line 21) which will be
followed by the leader sending a “QC, v + 1” (Line 23), and all honest nodes will enter view v + 1.
If Leader(v + 1) is not honest then the protocol dictates that the honest nodes that wished to
enter v+1will continue to forward their “WISH, v+1” message to the next leaders (up to Leader(v+
f + 1), Line 10) until each of them receives “TC, v + 1” . This is guaranteed since at least one of
those f + 1 leaders is honest.
The same process is then followed for “QC, v + 1” (Line 18), and eventually all of those v + 1
honest nodes will enter view v + 1. ⊳
◮ Lemma 12. Lumière achieves eventual view synchronization (Property 1).
Proof. From Claim 11 an honest node eventually will enter a new view, and by Claim 10 at least f+
1 honest nodes will enter the same view within a bounded time. By applying Claim 11 again and
again, eventually a view with an honest leader is reached (by applying Claim 11 recursively) and
by Claim 9 all honest nodes will enter the view within 4δ.
Thus, for any c ≥ 0, if the Lumière protocol is run with α = 4δ + c it is guaranteed that all
honest nodes will eventually execute the same view for |I| = c.
The above arguments can be applied inductively, i.e., there exists an infinite number of such
intervals and views in which view synchronization is reached. ◭
◮ Lemma 13. Lumière achieves synchronization validity (Property 2).
Proof. To enter a new view v a “QC, v” is needed, which is consisted of 2f+1 “VOTE, v” messages
i.e., at least f + 1 are from honest nodes. An honest node will send “VOTE, v” message only when
it receives a “TC, v” message, that requires f + 1 “WISH, v” message, meaning at least one of those
messages came from an honest node.
An honest node will send “WISH, v” when the upper-layer protocol invokes wish_to_advance()
while it was in view v − 1. ◭
This concludes the proof that Lumière is a synchronizer for any α ≥ 4δ. Similar to the broadcast-
based synchronizer, it allows upper-layer protocols to determine the time they spend in each view.
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Latency and communication Let vGSTmax be the maximum view an honest node is in at GST,
and let X denote the number of consecutive Byzantine leaders after vGSTmax . Assuming that lead-
ers are randomly allocated to views, then X is a random variable of a geometrical distribution
with a mean of n/(n − f). This means that in the worst case of t = f = ⌊n/3⌋, then
E(X) = (3f + 1)/(2f + 1) ≈ 3/2.
Since when f + 1 honest nodes at view v want to advance to view v + 1, and if Leader(v +
1) is honest, all honest nodes enter view v + 1 in constant time (Claim 9), the latency for view
synchronization, in general, is O(X · δ). For the same reasoning, this is also the case for any two
intervals between view synchronizations (see Def. 1).
In the worst-case of X = t, where t is the number of actual failures during the run, then latency
is linear in the view duration, i.e., O(t · δ). But, in the expected case of a constant number of
consecutive Byzantine leaders after vGSTmax , the expected latency is O(δ).
For communication complexity, there is a difference between Byzantine failures and benign
ones. If a Byzantine leader of a view r obtains “TC, v” for r − (f + 1) ≤ v ≤ r, then it can
forward the “TC, v” to all the f + 1 leaders that follow view v and those leaders will multicast the
message (Line 21), leading to O(n2) communication complexity.
In the case of benign failures, communication complexity is dependent on X , since the first
correct leader after vGSTmax will get all nodes to enter his view and achieve view synchronization, and
the benign leaders before it will only cause delays in terms of latency, but will not increase the
overall number of messages sent. Thus, in general, the communication complexity with benign
failures is O(X · n). In the worst-case of X = t communication complexity is O(t · n), but in
the average case it is linear, i.e., O(n). For the same reasoning, this is also the case between any
consecutive occurrences of view synchronization (see Def. 2).
To sum-up, the expected latency for both benign and Byzantine failures is O(δ), and worst-
case O(t · δ). Communication complexity for Byzantine nodes is optimistically O(n) and ex-
pected O(n2) and for benign nodes is expected O(n) and worst-case O(t · n).
4.4 Discussion
The three presented synchronizers have tradeoffs in their latency and communication costs. Hence,
a protocol designer may choose a synchronizer based on its needs and constraints. It may be possi-
ble to create combinations of the three protocols and achieve hybrid characteristics; we leave such
variations for future work.
In addition, there are differences in the constraints on α in these protocols, namely, the time
interval between two consecutive calls to wish_to_advance() (see Property 1). The view doubling
synchronizer prescribes a precise α, each view duration in exactly twice as its precedecessor. The
other two synchronizers lower bound α, in the broadcast-based by 2δ, and in Lumière by 4δ.
Another difference between the three protocols is that Lumière is the only one that uses the
Leader(·) mapping as part of the protocol itself. While the view doubling and broadcast-based
synchronizers achieve consecutive views synchronization after the first one is reached, Lumière
ensures this only for views v such that Leader(v) is honest. If an upper-layer protocol decides to
use Lumière as a synchronizer, it can take advantage and use the same Leader(·) mapping and be
certain that every view synchronization will also have an honest leader at the upper-layer protocol.
5 Related work
Failure detectors The seminal work of Chandra and Toueg [14, 15] introduces the leader elec-
tion abstraction, denoted Ω, and prove it is the weakest failure detector needed to solve consensus.
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By using Ω, consensus protocols can usually be written in a more natural way. The view synchro-
nization problem is similar to Ω, but differs in several ways. First, it lacks any notion of leader and
isolates the view synchronization component. This makes synchronizers relevant for a broad set of
asynchronous solutions, e.g., the TLC framework by Ford [25]. Second, view synchronization adds
recurrence to the problem definition. Third, it has a built-in notion of view-duration: nodes commit
to spend a constant tine in a view before moving to the next. Last, this paper focuses on latency and
communication costs of synchronizer implementations.
View synchronization in consensus protocols The idea of doubling round duration to cope
with partial asynchrony borrows from the DLS work [21], and has been employed in PBFT [13] and
in variousworks based on DLS/PBFT [3, 8, 38]. In these works, nodes double the length of each view
when no progress is made. Recently, HotStuff [38] encapsulates view synchronization in a module
named “Pacemaker”. Here, we provide a formal definition, concrete solutions, and performance
analysis of such a module.
Latency and message communication for consensus Dutta et al. [19] look at the number
of rounds it takes to reach consensus in the crash-fail model after a time defined as GSR (Global
Stabilization Round) which only correct nodes enter. This work provides an upper and a lower bound
for reaching consensus in this setting. Other works such as [2, 20] further discuss the latency for
reaching consensus in the crash-fail model. These works focus on the latency for reaching consensus
after GST. Both bounds are tangential to our performance measures, as they analyze round latency.
Dolev et al. [18] showed a quadratic lower bound on communication complexity to reach Byzan-
tine broadcast, which can be reduced to consensus. This lower bound is an intuitive baseline for
work like ours, though it remains open to prove a quadratic lower bound on view synchronization
per se.
Notion of time in distributed systems Causal ordering is a notion designed to give partial
ordering to events in a distributed system. The most known protocols to provide such ordering are
Lamport Timestamps [29] and vector clocks [23]. Both works assume a non-crash setting.
Recently, Ford published preliminary work on Threshold Logical Clocks (TLC) [25]. In a crash-
fail asynchronous setting, TLC places a barrier on view advancement, i.e., nodes advance to view v+
1 only after a threshold of them reached view v. A few techniques are also described on how to
convert TLCs to work in the presence of Byzantine nodes. The TLC notion of a view “barrier” is
orthogonal to view synchronization, though a 2-phase TLC is very similar to our reliable broadcast
synchronizer.
Clock synchronization The clock synchronization problem [32] in a distributed system re-
quires that the maximum difference between the local clock of the participating nodes is bounded
throughout the execution, which is possible since most works assume a synchronous setting. The
clock synchronization problem is well-defined and well-treaded, and there are many different algo-
rithms to ensure this in different models, e.g., [17, 27, 37]. In practical distributed networks, the
most prevalent protocol is NTP [34]. Again, clock synchronization is an orthogonal notion to view
synchronization, the latter guaranteeing entering and staying in a view within a bounded window,
but does not place any bound on the views of different nodes at any point in time.
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6 Conclusion
We formally defined the Byznatine view synchronization problem, that bridges classic works on fail-
ure detectors aimed to solve one-time consensus, and SMR which consists of multiple one-time
consensus instances. We analyzed protocols which achieve view synchronization in terms of la-
tency and communication complexity. We presented three synchronizer protocols along with their
performance tradeoffs.
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